(Received commendation in the John Locke Essay competition out of 775 submissions)
William Yixuan Wu – St. Andrew’s College, Northwestern University
- Introduction
In Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Sartre points out that with contemporary advancements in fields of science, “modern thought has realized considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it.”[1] Monist views based on the conceptions of materialism have dominated philosophical and social discussions in the developed world among everyday people and intellectuals alike. The prevailing scientific theories point to a deterministic world, where everything, including human thoughts and decisions, can be deconstructed into a series of causes and effects.
This begs the question: Can human beings be judged along the lines of normative ethics on the decisions they make if the world is wholly deterministic? It also calls into question the nature and existence of free will. Some essential clarifications are needed. This essay will not focus on the denotation and attribution of responsibility to individuals given the above circumstances. It will instead focus on the critical question that 20th-century philosophy often contends: if free will can exist within a monist, materialist, and deterministic world, what are the subsequent ethical implications of this realization?
To answer this question, we will investigate whether individual persons can be held responsible for their actions when we deconstruct an individual into a system of preferences and traits – which determinists today support is the predictable consequence of genetics and the environment. We can break down this argument into three major concepts:
- Normative Ethics
- Nature versus Nurture
- Free Will
Firstly, the analysis of normative ethics breaks down how individual actions should be evaluated. The philosophical tradition has favored one of two methodologies: focusing on the results of the actions (consequentialism) or the intentions of the individual (deontology). It becomes evident that regardless of the stance taken, neither methodology negates the individual’s responsibility.
Secondly, examining the age-old question of nature versus nurture through the fierce debates between rationalist and empiricist philosophers in the time of Immanuel Kant with the introduction of evolutionary and genetic theory.
Lastly, the question of the existence of free will in a presupposed wholly deterministic world, on which we will take a compatibilist view.
Ultimately, I argue that individuals are responsible for their actions and that we must resist the (often misconstrued) nihilistic attempts to deconstruct human actions.
- Normative Ethics
Immanuel Kant’s 1785 Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals introduces the idea of categorical imperatives that became the central philosophical concept of deontology.[2] He argues that sentient beings derive their duties from their moral “maxims,” which are imperative commandments of reasons originating from inner motivations.
As such, under Kant’s view of the categorical imperative, even if we are simply compelled by certain imperatives or commandments of reason, that can still be a basis for ethics and moral philosophy.
Aside from Kant’s rejection of the treatment of a person as merely a means to an end, noting that “act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, at all times also as an end, and not only as a means.”[3] The conception of a priori imperatives also allows the valuation of the validity of ethical arguments on a pre-existing system of necessity or preference (such as our genetic inheritance). Despite the apparent reduction of moral agency for the individual, we can consider his inheritance and preferences and hold those to be universal or human maxims and evaluate the individual’s responsibility therein.
Contrastingly, the theory of consequentialism focuses on the outcomes of actions rather than the innate characteristics of reasoning which results in that action. Consequentialists would argue that the ethical implications of action are derived entirely from its impact. In this view, even if we reduce the individual to be an unthinking and uncaring actor, bound entirely by his capabilities and acting in a sequence of specific causes and effects, those actions can still be evaluated by the results they cause.
An example of this consequentialism in action would be utilitarianism, which subscribes to the view that actions that maximize the well-being of affected individuals are ethically justified—first introduced by Francis Hutcheson in An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in 1725, arguing that actions are most moral when it brings the most amount of happiness.[4] Utilitarianism exemplifies consequentialist theory by attributing ethical values to persons by evaluating the results of their actions no matter their internal reasoning.
Regardless of which methodology of measure is used, the individual is always responsible, even with the proposition of the prompt.
- Nature vs. Nurture
As a result of the growing emphasis on scientific philosophy, many point to the advancements in the neuroscience of the brain to answer questions regarding consciousness and nature vs. nurture. Especially in the late 20th century, when monumental inventions such as the MRI scan allowed humans to observe brain activities at a closer level and the discoveries of various chemical processes that help explain human components like memory and emotions.[5]
Furthermore, there is a broad acceptance of the Darwinian theory of evolution in the scientific community, where an overwhelming majority of the western world believes and integrates it into society as definitive truth.[6] Combined with the genetic theory of DNA and how humans adapt to their environment, the prevalence of these theories has created an empiricist bias on the development of human decisions as merely a sum of our genetic makeup and a sequence of events that occur in the external world—leading to a popularized view that human decisions can be determined by viewing the summation of the inputs to a decision, even if those inputs are the person’s entire genetic makeup and every event which has occurred so far in his life in totality.
However, while modern empiricists would like us to believe that the nature versus nurture argument has been systematically answered, it does not account for the fact that individual beings are not merely passive participants of a sequence of events that occur around them but active participants in shaping the outcome of events. Other advancements in the scientific field of quantum mechanical theory also pointed to the fact that the physical world at the quantum level does not operate in a Classical Newtonian conception of a definitive one-to-one cause and effect but rather on probabilities and uncertainties.[7] Similarly, the process of natural selection in evolutionary theory and genetic inheritance in genetic theory may provide us with a selection of possible outcomes of traits and preferences in offspring given certain parents, but never claims that one outcome will definitively occur out of all the potential outcomes.[8]
These existing theories so far, while convincing when applied to their specific fields of research, are inconclusive in totality to reduce the entire concept of human consciousness into a deterministic understanding where the complexity of decision making is no longer a matter of understanding consciousness but instead amassing enough computational power to reproduce all the factors which contribute to that human decision. In our understanding, human decision-making is not yet proven to be wholly deterministic in the context of whether people can make different choices based on inner motivation unaffected by past events.
- Free Will
But even if we take it as a truth that human decisions can be wholly deterministic, using a compatibilist view on the relationship between determinism and free will, human beings are still ultimately responsible for their actions and decisions.
Under the compatibilist view, free will and determinism are mutually compatible without conflicting logically. In different situations, freedom can both exist or be absent, caused not by causal determinism. Causal determinism suggests that everything occurs due to the laws of nature, and everything is simply an effect of the process, meaning that human beings have no absolute control over their actions. A compatibilist does not reject this idea but rather that free will still exists under the deterministic point of view.
Compatibilists argue that freedom does not require the ability to do otherwise, as freedom is nothing more than an individual’s ability to act when there are no obstacles standing in their way. Determinism states that a person is simply a part of the natural laws that determine fate, which many may interpret as that there can be no free will since results are always predestined.
However, the first key argument of compatibilism is that individuals can still act out of their motivation even if the results are set in stone. For example, Thomas Hobbes stated in The Leviathan that a person’s freedom includes that he finds “no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.”[9] In the views of classical compatibilists, free will is the ability to do as one wants in the absence of any obstacles. As such, it may be mutually compatible that even if results are determined, the prompt to action must come from the individuals.
A common rebuke to compatibilism is that
(1) Free will requires the ability to do otherwise.
(2) If determinism is true, then no agent has the ability to do otherwise.
(3) Therefore, free will requires the falsity of causal determinism. (Source Free Will 2nd)
On these two premises, we can categorize compatibilists into two camps, the first who rejects premise 1 (also known as the “principle of alternative possibilities” or PAP) and those who reject premise 2. Harry Frankfurt developed arguments that rebuke the former premise (the principle of alternative possibilities), in which a person is morally responsible yet could not do otherwise at the time of their action.[10] For example, an economically disadvantaged person might be compelled to steal to feed his family. The outcome of the theft might be pre-determined (for instance, a mob boss acting behind the scenes unbeknownst to the person committing the theft), but that person can still commit his thoughts and decisions to commit the crime.
The first factor to consider is that this undermines the PAP argument. Individuals may very well act in a way that all outside and historical factors would have pre-determined for him to act, yet he still chose to commit to the same decision of their own volition.
The second factor is that personal moral responsibility should be examined based on the decision made by the acting party. Free will is not necessarily required freedom for moral responsibility.
In the classical compatibilist view, free will is simply the ability to act as one wants without obstacles, regardless of whether those desires are dictated by determinism. Regarding modern arguments against compatibilism, we argue that even when individuals seem to be acting without the ability to choose otherwise, they can still act within their own volition and should be held morally responsible. Therefore, determinism and its relationship to free will do not hinder our ability to assign personal moral responsibility.
V. Conclusion
The deterministic assumption to reduce human consciousness into a series of causes and effects, which has prevailed in the modern era of monist materialism, is greatly flawed as the relevant scientific endeavors are still in their infancy stages and often offer contradicting opinions. Furthermore, even taking causal determinism at face value, a compatibilist view allows for the coexistence of free will and, importantly, the continued importance of personal moral responsibility, which falls on the agent committing the actions. As Sartre’s French existentialism’s efforts to derive meaning from “nothingness,” too must we hold individuals responsible for their actions. Therefore, I conclude that we are ultimately responsible for our choices despite the possible external factors.
Bibliography
Alex Gendler. “Why Scientists Believe in Evolution,” July 8, 2013. https://letstalkscience.ca/educational-resources/stem-in-context/why-scientists-believe-in-evolution.
Gordon M. Shepherd. “Creating Modern Neuroscience: The Revolutionary 1950s,” September 30, 2009. https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Ns6PH2XsDmgC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=0vBc7jqjk3&sig=rK8nBKm9AXt7P_AhdWzi_2sM3z8&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false.
Harry G. Frankfurt. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 1969. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2023833.
Hutcheson, Francis. An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: In Two Treatises, 1726. https://books.google.ca/books/about/An_Inquiry_Into_the_Original_of_Our_Idea.html?id=XF4uAAAAYAAJ&redir_esc=y.
Jean-Paul Sartre. Being and Nothingness, 1943. http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documents/BeingAndNothingness_Sartre.pdf.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785.
T. Ryan Gregory. “Understanding Natural Selection: Essential Concepts and Common Misconceptions,” 2009. https://evolution-outreach.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1007/s12052-009-0128-1.
Thomas Hobbes. The Leviathan, 1651.
Werner Heisenberg. Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science, 1958. https://philpapers.org/rec/HEIPAP.
[1] Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness.
[2] Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
[3] Kant.
[4] Hutcheson, An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: In Two Treatises.
[5] Gordon M. Shepherd, “Creating Modern Neuroscience: The Revolutionary 1950s.”
[6] Alex Gendler, “Why Scientists Believe in Evolution.”
[7] Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science.
[8] T. Ryan Gregory, “Understanding Natural Selection: Essential Concepts and Common Misconceptions.”
[9] Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan.
[10] Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.
William Wu 
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